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Recent developments in macroeconomic policy, both in terms of theory and practice, have elevated monetary 
policy while fiscal policy has been downgraded. The latter is rarely mentioned in policy discussion, apart from 
arguing to place limits on budget deficits and fiscal variables. This paper presents the opposite view of Hyman 
P. Minsky. Rejecting the orthodox assumptions  of  unbounded individual and collective rationality,  Minsky 
places uncertainty and financial instability at the centre of his analysis. The limits of individual and collective 
rationality feed each other, generating deviation-amplifying mechanisms that make the economy unstable. The 
last one thus assumes a cyclical behaviour that drives it from the torrid summers of speculative booms to the 
gloomy winters of financial crises, debt deflations and deep depressions. Even if Minsky is generally considered 
as one of the main interpreters of Keynes, according to this work his economics is very different from Keynes’s 
one in terms both of business cycles and of growth. In comparison with the Keynesian tradition, according to 
Minsky fiscal policy is even more important and effective. Government intervention is not only necessary to 
reach and maintain full employment; it is also indispensable to contain capitalism’s instability and to avoid the 
disaster.  The  effect  of  fiscal  policy  is  not  only  to  underpin  and  stabilize  aggregate  demand,  income  and 
employment. It has also the task to protect the robustness of the financial system by stabilizing profits and by 
issuing government bonds. The opening up of the economy may increase its fragility, making fiscal policy even 
more important. The unprecedented growth of the domestic and international financial transactions, as well as 
the recent financial turmoil, confirm the validity of Minsky’s insights and make his views on fiscal policy even 
more noteworthy and fruitful. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Drawing on The General Theory, of which he is one of the most famous and original 
interpreters, Hyman Minsky rejects the orthodox pillars of unbounded individual and 
collective rationality. In his view, the limits of collective and individual rationality 
feed  each  other,  generating  destabilizing  deviation-amplifying  mechanisms.  As  a 
consequence, the economy endogenously creates a cyclical behaviour. According to 
this  contribution,  Minsky’s  business  cycles  (while  mirroring  the  same  waves  of 
optimism and pessimism envisaged by Keynes) are different from the ones described 
in chapter 22 of The General Theory. In terms of our perspective, Hyman Minsky 
may be  considered as an author that has extended the economics  of Keynes to a 
vibrant and euphoric economy, making it even more general and modern.  
In comparison with the Keynesian tradition, Hyman Minsky’s economics portrays 
fiscal policy as even more important and effective. Government intervention is not 
only necessary to reach and maintain full employment; it is also indispensable to 
contain capitalism’s instability, avoiding financial crises followed by debt deflations 
and deep depressions. The effect of fiscal policy is not only to underpin and stabilize 
aggregate demand, income and employment. It can also protect the robustness of the 
financial system by stabilizing profits and by issuing government bonds.  
In what follows, we begin in section 2 by considering the heterodox presuppositions 
of Minsky’s analysis.
1 In section 3 we examine his ‘financial instability hypothesis’. 
These sections prepare the analysis for the role that Minsky assigns to fiscal policy; 
section  4  considers  fiscal  policy  in  a  closed  economy,  and  section  5  extends  the 
analysis  to  the  open  economy  case.  Section  6  examines  the  soundness  of  public 
finance in a Minskyian business cycle framework, before we turn our attention to the 
question of fiscal policy in terms of the evolution and prospects of capitalism. Finally, 
section 8 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. The heterodox presuppositions of Minsky’s economics 
 
Over the last seventy years, the dominant macroeconomic theory has assumed ever 
new and more sophisticated facets. There seems to be, however, a continual thread in 
its evolution: the constant reference to General Equilibrium Theory (GET). It is thus 
this aspect that seems to qualify macroeconomic orthodoxy. Amongst other things,  
  3 
standard GET is based on two fundamental pillars: (i) the assumption of unbounded 
individual  rationality,  according  to  which,  at  any  given  price  vector,  perfectly 
competitive  agents  are  able  to  choose  the  quantities  that  maximise  their  target 
function  and  (ii)  the  assumption  of  unbounded  collective  rationality,  according  to 
which prices are able to lead to an instantaneous and generalized market clearing.  
Seventy years ago, The General Theory rejected the perfect rationality assumptions. 
Firstly, in Keynes’s world agents have a bounded rationality. The future, in particular, 
is totally unknown to them. Secondly, the equilibrium price vector may not exist. The 
existence of a positive interest rate level able to align full employment savings and 
investments is, for instance, not guaranteed. Moreover, even if the equilibrium price 
vector  did  exist,  there  would  be  no  auctioneer  that  instantly  leads  prices  to  their 
equilibrium level.
2 The perfect rationality pillars, and with them GET, are thus totally 
unrealistic and  have  to  be  rejected.  In  short,  this  seems  to  be  the  essence  of  the 
Keynesian ‘revolution’. 
Revolutions, as we know, are usually followed by counter-revolutions. In the case 
under examination, the counter-revolution (the Neoclassical Synthesis) takes place 
immediately after the publication of The General Theory. In its course, which starts 
with Hicks (1937) and culminates with Patinkin (1956), the Synthesis ends up with 
recovering the GET as a benchmark. With this, GET is again proposed as a reliable 
approximation of reality. It is simply necessary to take into account that in the short-
run some gears of the adjustment mechanism can jam, giving rise to deviations from 
general equilibrium. Specifically, the Synthesis believes that in the short-run nominal 
wages  are  rigid.  In  the  presence  of  a  recessionary  shock,  aggregate  demand  thus 
temporarily gains the faculty to contain economic activity below its full employment 
level.  
Monetarism keeps adopting general equilibrium as a benchmark. This time, however, 
short-run deviations from general equilibrium become supply (rather than demand) 
phenomena. In addition, the maladjustment causing these deviations emanate from 
inflationary expectations in Friedman’s Monetarism Mark 1 and from inter-temporal 
relative  prices  in  Lucas’s  Monetarism  Mark  2.
3  In  the  latter  case,  unbounded 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 See, also, Papadimitriou and Wray (1998). 
2 For a technical and illuminating critique of general equilibrium theory, see Velupillai 2005a and 
2005b. 
3 The definition of Monetarism Mark 1 and 2 is based on the fact that, in both cases, what determines 
economic fluctuations are the shocks concerning money supply. The main references are Friedman 
1968  for  Monetarism  Mark  1  and  Lucas  and  Rapping  1969,  Lucas  1972  and  Lucas  1973  for 
Monetarism Mark 2.  
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rationality takes the place of the auctioneer. Agents are now so clever and informed to 
find by themselves the equilibrium price vector. Except for unforeseeable random 
surprises,  the  system  is  in  its  general  equilibrium.  With  the  Real  Business  Cycle 
Theory,  maladjustments  disappear  and  shocks  only  determine  general  equilibrium 
fluctuations.
4 With this, the rehabilitation of GET is complete.  
Hyman Minsky’s contributions cover the period 1954-1996 in which GET resurfaces, 
firstly as a benchmark and then as a direct representation of reality. Drawing on The 
General Theory, of which he is one of the most famous and original interpreters, 
Minsky (1975) rejects as unrealistic the unbounded rationality pillars. In Minsky’s 
(op.  cit.)  view,  the  limits  of  collective  and  individual  rationality  feed each  other, 
generating deviation-amplifying mechanisms that make the economy unstable. 
Starting  with  the  collective  rationality,  Minsky  (1975,  1982a,  1986)  radicalizes 
Keynes’s  arguments.  He  does  not  limit  himself  to  reject  the  auctioneer  (i.e.  the 
omnipotence of the price mechanism) but banishes the concept of equilibrium itself. 
Hyman Minsky’s economics is not unstable because it lacks the tendency to general 
(or  any  other)  equilibrium.  It  is  unstable  because  its  structure  and  the  qualitative 
characteristics of its dynamic behaviour autonomously evolve with the simple passing 
of time (Vercelli, 2001). It endogenously changes in the same way as seasons do, 
assuming a cyclical behaviour that drives it from the torrid summers of speculative 
booms to the gloomy winters of debt deflations and deep depressions. 
Let us now come to the limits of individual rationality. Minsky’s (1975, 1982a, 1986, 
1996) world endogenously changes at a pace quicker than the one compatible with 
learning processes. Agents do not succeed in knowing the model and (above all) are 
conscious  of  this.  To  quote  Minsky  (1996):  “The  uncertainty  that  permeates  the 
economics  of  Keynes  and  the  economics  of  bounded  rationality  is  due  to  the 
unsureness about the validity of the model that enters in the decision process” (p. 2). 
What matters is not only the expectation about the future, but also the confidence 
placed in it. Both of them are based on recent past and consequently end up with 
performing  a  deviation-amplifying  role.  As  Minsky  (1986)  argues,  “A  history  of 
success will tend to diminish the margins of safety that business and bankers require 
and will thus tend to be associated with increased investment; a history of failure will 
do the opposite” (p. 187). The limits of collective and individual rationality thus feed 
each other performing a deviation-amplifying role.  
                                                            
4  Contrary  to  Monetarism  Mark 1  and  2,  this time  shocks are  real  and  concern  productivity. See 
Kydland and Prescott 1982.  
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Drawing on The General Theory, Minsky (1975) places uncertainty at the centre of 
his analysis. Uncertainty mainly hits perspective yields on financial and real assets. 
Investments external financing thus becomes a crucial issue.
5 Advanced economies 
presuppose large and expensive long-term investments that are debt financed. The 
underlying  expectation  is  that  investments  generate  profits  greater  than  debt 
commitments.  This  expectation,  however,  is  not  necessarily  confirmed  by  facts.
6 
More generally, the coherence of a market economy does not require only the clearing 
of all individual markets. It also requires that investments actually generate profits 
greater than debt commitments (Minsky 1986, p. 141).  
Starting from these presuppositions, Minsky (1975, 1978, 1982a, 1986) launches his 
attack on the dominant theory. Even if general equilibrium did represent a reliable 
approximation  to  reality,  the  price  mechanism  would  not  necessarily  be  able  to 
coordinate the system. Let us consider a situation of unemployment. Insofar as wage 
and price deflation is associated by a fall in profits, it decreases firms’ ability to fulfill 
inherited debt commitments. In this way it jeopardizes the robustness of the financial 
system,  with  depressing  effects  on  long-term  expectations  and  investments.  In 
conformity with the experience of 1929-33 and to the ‘true’ thought of Keynes, the 
fall in prices can thus depress aggregate demand, accentuating unemployment instead 
of reabsorbing it.  
In addition to the realism and stability of the general equilibrium, however, Minsky 
also  questions  the  less  ambitious  concept  of  short-run  equilibrium.  Subjective 
evaluations  ruling  financial  markets  and  expected  returns  on  real  assets  are 
changeable  and  consequently  investment  is  volatile.  Short-run  equilibrium 
continuously  changes  with  the  passing  of  time  and  the  system  never  succeeds  in 
reaching it. Instead of speaking of equilibrium or disequilibrium, Minsky (1986, p. 
176), just like Robinson (1971), argues in terms of states of tranquility, which hide in 
themselves destabilizing forces destined to gain strength with the simple passing of 
time. As in case of the seasons, every state nurtures the forces destined to change it.  
By  relying  on  the  rationality  pillars,  the  dominant  theory  has  amputated  crucial 
aspects of the reality as uncertainty, the external financing of capital accumulation, 
the relevance of monetary and financial factors, the financial instability of capitalism 
and the crucial role of institutions. The originality and the importance of Minsky’s 
                                                            
5 To quote Tobin 1989 p. 107: “He is right to stress that monetary and financial institutions and market 
make a big difference and to reject Modigliani-Miller theorem that assets and debts which wash out in 
accounting aggregations wash out in economic effects as well.” 
6 As a consequence, the robustness of the financial system cannot be taken for granted.   
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contributions lies precisely in recovering these issues and placing them at the centre 
of his financial instability hypothesis.  
 
3. Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis 
 
Minsky  (1975)  presented  his  financial  instability  hypothesis  as  an  authentic 
interpretation/a legitimate extension of Keynes’ thought.
7 As we have seen, the basic 
vision of the two authors is actually the same. In bringing back Keynes’s theory to its 
cyclical  perspective,  however,  Minsky  (op.  cit.)  introduces  an  upward  instability, 
which  seems  entirely  extraneous  to  The  General  Theory.
8  Specifically,  Minsky’s 
starting point is that “stability…is destabilizing” (p. 12), and that “the fundamental 
instability is upward” (p. 165). A period of tranquillity (in which the financial system 
is robust and there are no relevant shocks, so that profits are systematically greater 
than debt commitments) increases the confidence in the future, giving rise to a wealth 
re-allocation  from  money  to  other  assets.  The  result  is  an  increase  in  investment 
financed with indebtedness. With this, stability turns into an expansion. 
Expansion  triggers  a  deviation-amplifying  mechanism  primarily  based  on  the  link 
investments-profits-investments.  An  initial  increase  in  investment  provokes  an 
income expansion, which partly turns into a rise in profits. Besides validating past 
investment decisions, this improves profit expectations and confidence and thus gives 
rise to a further increase in the volume of investment financed by indebtedness. The 
money and financial markets strengthen the above-mentioned deviation-amplifying 
mechanism. Expansion implies an endogenous increase in  bank credit and  money 
supply  that  strengthens  the  expansion  itself.  With  the  growing  optimism,  the 
speculative  demand  for  money  shrinks  in  favour  of  other  assets  inducing 
expansionary effects on credit, investments, income and profits. Through its wealth 
effects, the rise in asset prices stimulates credit and capital accumulation as well. 
Lastly,  as  we  have  seen,  expectations  and  confidence  also  perform  a  deviation-
amplifying role. Thanks to the aforementioned processes, expansion turns into a debt-
financed investment boom. 
                                                            
7 In Minsky’s (1975) view, since John Maynard Keynes lived through the experience of the Great 
Depression he thereby dwelled upon the particular case of an economy, which, as a consequence of a 
financial crisis followed by a debt deflation, fell into a deep depression. Despite not fully developing it, 
however, in Minsky’s (op. cit.) view Keynes had in mind a cyclical perspective. 
8 This might be the reason why Minsky (1975) prefers to speak of a financial instability ‘hypothesis’, 
rather than of a financial instability ‘theory’. This aspect is developed in De Antoni (2007).  
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At this point, Minsky (1975, 1978, 1982a, 1982b, 1986) focuses on two drawbacks of 
such  a  boom.  The  first  one  refers  to  the  general  euphoria,  whereby  firms’  debt 
commitments increase more rapidly than profits, ending by rising above them. Given 
the  expectation  of  a  future  bonanza,  firms  start  financing  the  principal  by 
indebtedness (speculative financing) and also interest payments (ultra-speculative or 
Ponzi financing). The fulfilment of debt commitments is based no longer on profits 
but, respectively, on the rolling over or the automatic increase in indebtedness. From 
being initially robust, the financial system becomes fragile.
9 Turning to the second 
drawback, the persistence of the boom inevitably ends up creating either bottlenecks 
in the financial system or inflationary pressures in the goods market that push the 
central bank in a deflationary direction. In both cases, the result is an increase in the 
rate of interest.
10  
The rise in the interest rate ends the boom, turning the investment-profit-investment 
chain  into  a  downward  spiral.  The  unexpected  increase  in  the  cost  of  funds  is 
associated with the unexpected fall in (the yet insufficient) profits. Given the situation 
of financial fragility, the fulfillment of inherited debt commitments would require an 
increase  in  (the  already  high)  indebtedness.  This  solution,  however,  is  neither 
desirable nor possible since the confidence underlying indebtedness fades away. We, 
thus, come to the financial crisis, defined (Minsky, 1982b) as a situation in which 
firms’ debt commitments cannot be fulfilled any more in the normal way, i.e. by 
profits (hedge finance) or indebtedness (speculative and Ponzi finance).  
Under these circumstances, for firms the only solution is the sale of assets, which after 
the boom are mainly illiquid assets. The fall in the asset prices reduces the net wealth 
of firms and financial intermediaries. This reinforces the need to squeeze indebtedness 
by  selling  assets.  Asset  prices  fall  precipitously.  The  fall  of  capital  asset  prices 
strengthens the fall of investments and profits, and vice versa.
11 The financial crisis, 
thus, turns into a debt deflation, which in Minsky’s (1982b) framework is an asset 
price  as  well  as  a  profit  deflation.  The  debt  deflation  will  end  by  making  the 
                                                            
9According to Minsky (1986, pp. 206-207 in particular), a robust financial system is dominated by 
hedge units, which by definition are able to fulfil their debt commitments by profits. A fragile financial 
system is instead dominated by speculative and ultra-speculative (or Ponzi) units. Having to fulfil their 
debt commitments by indebtedness, speculative and Ponzi units are more vulnerable to the conditions 
prevailing in financial markets. 
10 Minsky (1978) puts it as follows: “However, the internal workings of the banking mechanism or 
Central Bank action to constrain inflation will result in the supply of finance being less than infinitely 
elastic leading to a rapid increase in short term interest rates” (p. 45). 
11 According to Minsky (1975, 1978, 1982a, 1986), investments are a positive function of the gap 
between the demand price for investment goods (the present value of expected profits) and the supply 
price (the price of current production).   
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fulfilment  of  debt  commitments  impossible.  The  consequence  will  be  a  wave  of 
bankruptcies, which in its turn will end in a deep depression. 
Destruction,  however,  is  creative.  Only  hedge  units  (units  still  able  to  fulfil  debt 
commitments by profits) survive. Under these circumstances, a phase of tranquility 
will  suffice  to  increase  confidence  and  to  reactivate  the  sequence  just  described. 
According to Minsky’s (1975, 1986) financial instability hypothesis, the system will 
again  experience  an  expansion,  a  speculative  boom,  a  financial  crisis  and  a  debt 
deflation, along with a deep depression.  
Turning to the real world, Minsky (1982a, 1986) finds confirmation of his analysis. 
The  financial  instability  of  the  American  economy,  which  he  had  previously 
denounced (Minsky, 1963), surfaced in the middle of the sixties giving rise to the 
crises of 1966, 1970, 1974-5, 1979, and 1982. Financial instability had, however, 
characterized  also  the  periods  preceding  the  two  world  wars.  This  confirms  that 
financial crises are systemic and not idiosyncratic (Minsky, 1991). Looking ahead, 
Minsky (1982a) wonders whether ‘It’ can happen again. ‘It’ is the Great Depression 
and Minsky’s (op. cit.) answer is affirmative. Starting from these presuppositions, a 
crucial role to economic policy institutions is assigned. As Minsky (1986) suggests, 
“even though all capitalisms are flawed, we can develop a capitalism in which the 
flaws are less evident than they have been since 1967” (p. 295).
12 
From this point of view, Minsky does not place much faith in monetary policy. Given 
that a great part of the money supply is endogenously created by banks and given the 
innovative capacity of the financial system, the central bank has only a limited control 
over the supply of money. In any case, its intervention may turn out to be harmful as 
well as ineffective. As Minsky (1986) argues, “Monetary policy to constrain undue 
expansion and inflation operates by way of disrupting financing markets and asset 
values.  Monetary  policy  to  induce  expansion  operates  by  interest  rates  and  the 
availability  of  credit,  which  do  not  yield  increased  investment  if  current  and 
anticipated profits are low” (p. 303-4). Instead of aiming to control the money supply, 
the  central  bank  should  thus  focus  on  its  function  as  a  lender  of  last  resort.  By 
enabling the funding of financial institutions and by sustaining asset prices, it might 
prevent or reabsorb financial crisis, so removing the threat of debt deflations and deep 
depressions.  In  any  case,  “Fiscal  policies  are  more  powerful  economic  control 
                                                            
12 The task Minsky (1992) assigns to economic policy institutions is anything but easy. They must be 
continuously revised and kept up to date, since the flaws of capitalism are always evolving (Minsky 
and Whalen, 1996). It follows that Minsky (1992) strongly disagrees about the adoption of fixed rules 
in economic policy.  
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weapons than monetary manipulations” (p. 304). The task to stabilize and to support 
the economy has to fall on the government. This is the main message of Minsky’s 
famous 1986 book: Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. 
Setting  aside  the  relative  importance  assigned  to  monetary  or  fiscal  manoeuvres, 
Minsky  (1975,  1986)  proposes  a  more  general  rethinking  of  the  final  targets  of 
economic policy. Specifically, he questions the dominant model based on investment 
and growth. Being a determinant of mark up and profits, investment increases the 
price level.  It also  represents  a  highly  unstable  component  of  domestic  aggregate 
demand. Above all, it may turn out to be a failure and compromise the stability and 
growth of the system.
13 It follows that “an economy that aims at accelerating growth 
through  devices that induce capital-intensive private  investment  not only may not 
grow, but may be increasingly inequitable in its income distribution, inefficient in its 
choices of techniques, and unstable in its overall performance” (Minsky, 1986, p. 
292).  
 
4. Fiscal policy in a closed economy  
 
After the Keynesian revolution, the progressive rehabilitation of market mechanisms 
has  not  only  implied  the  downsizing  of fiscal policy  as a  support and  stabilizing 
economic weapon. The dominant theory has also deployed ever-new arguments to 
show that budget deficits are ineffectual or undesirable. Arestis and Sawyer (2003a 
mainly, but see, also, 2003b, 2004) criticize these arguments one by one. In their 
view, the free market is not necessarily able to align full employment savings and 
investments. A government deficit is thus necessary to fill the gap between the two.  
Drawing  on  the  same  Keynesian  tradition,  Minsky  (1975,  1982a,  1986)  further 
extends the role of the government. If we abandon the equilibrium framework making 
room for the endogenous instability of capitalism, “laissez-faire is a prescription for 
economic disaster” (Minsky and Whalen, 1996, p. 161). Government intervention is 
not only necessary to reach and maintain full employment. It is indispensable to avoid 
the worst; in Minsky’s (1982a) words: “The most significant economic event of the 
era since World War II is something that has not happened: there has not been a deep 
and long-lasting depression” (p. xi). One of the main reasons is that “Big government 
capitalism is more stable than small government capitalism” (Minsky, 1986, p. 292). 
                                                            
13 Bad  investments  may  generate  profits  lower  than  debt  commitments  and  thus foster  a wave  of 
bankruptcies that depress expectations, confidence and economic activity.  
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The  afore-mentioned  extension  of  the  role  of  fiscal  policy  is  associated  with  a 
widening of its effects. To the traditional impact on the goods market, Minsky adds 
two important repercussions on the robustness of the financial system. As Minsky 
(1986) argues: “The first effect is familiar and is dealt with in models that set out how 
GNP  is  determined.  The  second  and  third  effects  are  often  ignored;  they  are 
important,  however,  because  the  economy  is  both  an  income-producing  and  -
distributing  system  and  a  complicated,  interdependent,  and  sophisticated  financial 
system” (p. 21). The three effects that Minsky (1986) assigns to fiscal policy are 
discussed in detail immediately below. 
(i)  The  traditional  income  and  employment  effect,  which  consists  in  stimulating 
aggregate demand, output and employment up to their full employment levels. In an 
advanced society, all those wishing to participate in the productive process should 
have the opportunity to do so. Given the unreliability of market mechanisms, the State 
has to take on the function of “employer of last resort” (Minsky and Whalen, 1996, p. 
163).
14 Specifically, it has to give rise to a perfectly elastic public-sector demand for 
labour at a wage significantly lower than in the private sector (Minsky, 1986, p. 308). 
Public-sector workers should be employed to increase the physical and intellectual 
infrastructures.
15 To quote Minsky (op. cit.): “The overall policy perspective is to 
substitute resource creating public spending for the multitude of transfer payments 
and entitlements that now make up a major part of non-military spending” (p. 300). 
According to Minsky (1986), in this way the burden for the government budget of the 
employment of last resort strategy is destined to be small. 
(ii)  The cash  flows  effect,  which  operates  by  affecting  the sectoral  surpluses and 
deficits. In his works, Minsky (1986, 1992) adopts a conception à la Kalecki-Kaldor-
Levy according to which income distribution mirrors the level and composition of 
aggregate  demand  rather  than  input  productivity.  In  clearing  the  goods  market, 
income fluctuations align aggregate profits to the sum of investments, government 
                                                            
14 Recent years have seen a flourishing of the debate on the employment of last resort strategy. See, for 
instance, Aspromourgos (2000), Forstater (1998), Gordon (1997), Mitchell (1998, 2000), Mitchell and 
Watts (1997), Mosler (1997), Sawyer (2003), and Wray (1998a, 1998b, 2001). 
15 While being a great supporter of the government, Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1986) is perfectly aware of 
its  limits.  Like  investments,  government  deficit  is a  determinant  of  mark  up  and  profits and  thus 
sustains the price level. Government intervention is  often inefficient. Above all, by  stabilizing the 
economy, government (as well as the central bank) may legitimize speculative behaviours. To avoid 
the  aforementioned  drawbacks,  Minsky  (1975,  1982a,  1986,  1991)  suggests  intervening  in  two 
directions. Firstly, it is necessary to qualify government intervention in order to increase investments in 
the physical and intellectual  infrastructures, thus stimulating the productivity  and efficiency  of the 
system. Secondly, he suggests hindering speculative behaviours by carefully regulating the balance 
sheets of firms and financial intermediaries.  
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budget, net exports and capitalists’ consumption net of workers’ savings.
16 In order to 
guarantee  the  coherence  of  a  capitalist  economy,  profits  thus  determined  have  to 
exceed firms’ inherited debt commitments. It is here that fiscal policy comes into 
play.  In  reabsorbing  unemployment,  fiscal  policy  stimulates  profits  to  their  full 
employment level, thus strengthening the economy’s financial robustness. The task to 
hinder the destabilizing tendencies present in the system then falls on automatic fiscal 
stabilizers:  changes  in  the  government  budget  have  to  compensate for  investment 
fluctuations in order to stabilize income and profits. By avoiding the rise in profits 
due to an investment expansion, automatic fiscal stabilizers might hinder the euphoric 
tendency to a speculative boom and a financial crisis. By sustaining profits above 
inherited debt commitments during an after crisis investment slow down, automatic 
fiscal stabilizers might defuse the threat of a financial crisis that might degenerate into 
a debt deflation and a deep depression.  
(iii)  The  portfolio  or  balance-sheet  effect,  which  operates  through  regulating  the 
liquidity and solvency of the financial system. Minsky (1986) denies that the main 
characteristic of money lies in having a fixed price (the prices of goods and assets 
from which its purchasing power depends is variable) or in being the medium of 
exchange (in socialist countries money was the medium of exchange but did not have 
any special role in the economy). According to Minsky (op. cit.) the peculiarity of 
money  lies,  instead,  in  that  payment  commitments  connected  to  indebtedness,  to 
productive  activity,  to  taxation  are  denominated  in  money  itself.  By  allowing  the 
fulfilment of such payment commitments, money offers “insurance services against 
bankruptcy” (p. 181). Government bonds can be easily converted into money. Thus, 
they  too  offer  insurance  services  against  bankruptcy.  Together  with  money,  they 
increase the robustness of the financial system.
17 
The complexity of Minsky’s (1975, 1982a, 1986) financial instability hypothesis gave 
rise  to  numerous  formalizations  that  focused  on  one  aspect  or  another.  A  model, 
which brings to light the crucial importance of the government budget for the support 
and stabilization of income and profits (and thus of the financial system) is the one 
                                                            
16  Following  Minsky  (1986,  1992),  aggregate  saving  S  is  the  sum  of  workers’  saving  (Sw)  and 
capitalists’  saving  (Sc),  equal  in  its  turn  to  the  difference  between  capitalists’  profits  (Π)  and 
capitalists’ consumption (Cc). This means that S=Sw+(Π-Cc). By substituting into the goods market 
equilibrium condition, I+DF+NX=S, and rearranging we get: Π=I+DF+NX+Cc-Sw. The relationship 
connecting profits to investments obviously holds only at an aggregate level. At a microeconomic 
level, profit generated by investment does not usually go the investing firm.  
17 The argument in the main text puts forward an additional argument in favor of automatic fiscal 
stabilizers. Through the government budget anti-cyclical behaviour, they imply an increase (decrease) 
in government bond issues during recessions (expansions), thereby stabilizing the financial system.  
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proposed by Nasica and Raybaut (2005). Apart from the assumption of endogenous 
money,  the  model  leaves  the  financial  and  credit  variables  behind  the  scenes. 
Nevertheless, it contains some of the typical ingredients of Minsky’s (1975, 1982a, 
1986)  financial  instability  hypothesis.  We  refer  to  the  deviation-amplifying 
mechanisms based on the link investment-profit-investment, on the adaptive nature of 
profit expectations and of the state of confidence. The model under examination is 














4. it =i*+axt+bφt 




7. Πt =[It+Dt-(1-c)W*]/[1-c(1-ρ)] 
8. Dt =γ(It) (Ct+It) 
 
The first six equations show Minsky’s (1975, 1978, 1982a, 1986) ‘financial theory of 
investment’. Investment It (equation 1) is a positive and increasing function h of the 
gap between the demand price for investment goods PKt and the given supply price 
(the price of current production) PI
*. The demand price PKt (equation 2) in its turn is 
equal to the present value of expected profits (Π
e
t+1) in the next period, where it stands 
for  the  discount  rate.  Expected  profits  in  the  next  period  Π
e
t+1  (equation  3)  are 
adaptively given by expected profits in the current period Π
e
t plus a positive fraction α 
(where 0≤ α ≤1) of the current forecasting profit error Πt-Π
e
t. The firm’s discount rate 
it (equation 4) is equal to the given risk less interest rate i* set by the central bank plus 
the parameter a<0 times the degree of confidence xt and the parameter b>0 times the 
borrower’s  risk  φt.  The  latter  is  the  risk  that  expectations  can  go  wrong  so  that 
realized  profits  might  not  allow  the  fulfilment  of  debt  commitments.  The  risk  φt 
(equation  5)  is  specified  as  an  increasing  function  Ф  of  externally  financed 
investments It-ρΠt, where ρ is the rate of profit retention. The degree of confidence 
xt+1 (equation 6) depends on its previous value xt and on the profit expectations errors 
Πt-Π
e
t. These first six equations show that realized profits higher than the expected 
ones not only  do they  validate past  investment  decisions, but  also improve  profit 
expectations Π
e
t+1 and confidence xt+1. They, thus, stimulate the demand price for, and  
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the level of, investment. A fall in the cost of investment goods PI
* and of the risk less 
interest rate set by the central bank i* also lead to an investment expansion. Even 
taking  into  account  the  endogeneity  of  profits,  an  aspect  we  discuss  below,  the 
increase in investment is associated with an increase in indebtedness. 
While  the  first  six  equations  describe  the  expansionary  effect  that  profit  has  on 
investment, equation (7) introduces the expansionary effect that investment has on 
profits. Assuming a consumption function of the type Ct=c[W*+(1-ρ)Πt], where c is 
the  propensity  to  consume,  W*  is  the  given  total  wages  and  (1-ρ)Πt  represents 
distributed profits, the Kalecki relation (equation 7) tells us that, in clearing the goods 
market, income fluctuations relate aggregate profits Πt to investment It, government 
deficit Dt, and total wages W*. In this way, equation 7 establishes an interdependence 
between profits and investment which represents the milestone of Minsky’s deviation 
amplifying  process.  Higher  investment  implies  higher  profits,  which  in  their  turn 
improve profit expectations and confidence; the latter further stimulate investment. 
The seventh equation, also brings to light the support that government deficit provides 
for income and profits, with the well-known positive effects on economic activity and 
financial  robustness.  The  last  equation  introduces  the  automatic  fiscal  stabilizers. 
Government deficit Dt (equation 8) is a fraction γ of private expenditure Ct+It. By 
assumption, γ is a decreasing function of It included between –σ and +σ (with 0≤σ<1). 
It  thus  captures  the  negative  relationship  between  the  government  budget  and 
investments  to  which  Minsky  (1986)  assigns  the  crucial  task  of  stabilizing  the 
economy.  
We may now turn our attention to the conclusions of Nasica and Raybaut (2005). 
Their model admits a ‘nirvana’ stationary state (It=Ī) that shares many ingredients of 
the  standard  macroeconomic  approach:  perfect  foresights  (Πt=Π
e
t),  irrelevance  of 
indebtedness (It-ρΠt=0), irrelevance of the borrower’s risk (φt =0), and irrelevance of 
uncertainty (xt=0). This stationary state, however, turns to be locally asymptotically 
stable if and only if automatic fiscal stabilizers are strong enough. In other words, for 
the system to converge to the stationary state, government budget changes have to 
offset  investment  fluctuations  sufficiently.  Lastly,  for  given  parameter  values,  the 
model may generate endogenous cycles similar to the ones envisaged by Minsky.
18 
 
5. Fiscal policy in an open economy  
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Hyman Minsky’s analysis mainly refers to a closed economy, although here and there 
one does come across references to open economy (see Minsky, 1979, for such an 
example). However, his analysis can easily be extended and sufficiently generalised to 
an open economy. The merit of such an extension mainly consists in the relevance it 
assigns to international credit-debt relationships and to the fulfilment of the related 
debt commitments.  
In an open economy, firms (as well as financial intermediaries) have the opportunity 
to borrow abroad. This opportunity on the one hand favours growth. On the other 
hand, however, it also paves the way for a situation of over-indebtedness prone to the 
‘disruptive  events’  in  the  way  described  by  Arestis  and  Glickman  (2002).  The 
aforementioned  scenery  is  strengthened  by  the  striking  increase  experienced  by 
international financial transactions in the last couple of decades or so. In this context, 
the international financial transactions influenced by differential interest rates and by 
the  prospects  of  exchange  rate  movements  have  grown  relative  to  the  exchange 
transactions related to international trade.
 This phenomenon is not unconnected with 
the volatility of exchange rates (real as well as nominal) observed in post Bretton 
Woods era. This volatility obviously introduces an additional source of uncertainty. 
In  a  Hyman  Minsky  perspective,  the  opening  of  the  economy  fuels  economic 
instability in the following ways. 
(i) For many countries, international trade accounts for a quarter or more of GDP. 
Under these circumstances, exchange rate volatility may imply a high volatility of net 
exports and domestic incomes. 
(ii)  Given  the  Kalecki-Kaldor  equation  (Minsky  1986,  1992),  the  volatility  of 
domestic incomes also implies the volatility of domestic profits. The fulfilment of 
debt commitments thus becomes more uncertain.  
(iii)  In  the  presence  of foreign  borrowing  in  foreign  exchange,  the  exchange  rate 
volatility  turns  into  the  volatility  of  debt  commitments  denominated  in  foreign 
currency. The financial system becomes vulnerable to exchange rate, in addition to 
the interest rate, fluctuations. In other words, it becomes more fragile. 
(iv) Debt commitments on loans incurred in a particular currency have to be repaid in 
that currency. Thus, not only does there have to be sufficient profit flows to fulfil debt 
commitments, but those profit flows have also to be, or to be able to be, converted 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 To quote Nasica and Raybout (2005, p. 143): “Notice that since Det(J*)>0, the model can admit two 
complex eigenvalues, which may generate, for the relevant set of parameters, endogenous cycles. This  
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into the relevant currency. There are numerous examples of countries indebted in 
foreign currency (e.g. many Eastern European  countries in  the  second half of  the 
1980s and some Asian economies in the late 1990s
19) where a trade surplus did not 
emerge and access to capital inflows faltered, threatening the ability to repay foreign 
loans. 
v) Given the high and increasing international financial integration, and as shown by 
the recent financial turmoil, financial crises tend to spread from one country to the 
others, thus increasing the overall instability. 
To sum up, Minsky’s approach suggests that the opening up of the economy may 
accentuate  its  coordination  problems  and  increase  its  fragility.  Under  these 
circumstances, the  role and the international coordination of fiscal  policy become 
even more important. The same holds for the necessity to regulate the balance sheets 
of firms and financial intermediaries, including foreign indebtedness. 
 
6. The soundness of public finance and Minsky’s business cycle  
 
Giving his support for the functional finance
20 and the state money (or chartalist) 
approach,
21 Minsky (1963, 1975) initially does not consider government debt as a 
problem for the economy. On the contrary, he argues that government bonds are an 
important source of liquidity and solvency and thus of financial stability. With the 
explosion  of  the  government  debt  relative  to  gross  domestic  product  during  the 
Reagan-Bush  administration,  however,  Minsky  (1986)  begins  to  express  concerns 
                                                                                                                                                                      
issue will not be dealt with in this paper”.  
19  For  a  Minskyan  interpretation  of  the  Asian  financial  crisis,  see  Kregel  (2001)  and  Arestis  and 
Glickman (2002). 
20 According to Lerner (1943), fiscal variables must be evaluated on the basis of their effects on the 
economy rather than on the basis of a priori criteria of sound finance. In this perspective, government 
expenditure and revenues must be considered as aggregate demand control devices whose task is to 
align the latter to its full employment level. Government bonds sales must in their turn guarantee the 
desired level of the interest rate (and thus of investments). The remaining part of the government deficit 
(including the interest payments on government debt) can simply be financed by money. In Lerner’s 
view,  below  full  employment  there  is  no  inevitable  link  between  money  and  the  price  level.  His 
conclusion is that government deficit and debt present “no danger to society” (p. 42). 
21 According to the state money or chartalist approach, fiscal authorities first define what money is by 
stating that which is necessary to pay taxes and then create (destroy) money through the government 
deficit  (surplus).  The  US  federal  government  funds  itself  by  writing  cheques  on  its  central  bank 
account, which once deposited turn into new bank reserves (Wray, 1998b; Bell and Wray 2002-3). 
Bond sales by either the central bank or the treasury are properly seen as part of a ‘horizontally’ 
oriented monetary policy designed to prevent the interest rate from falling below its target value. Bonds 
are not sold to borrow but to drain excess reserves. If markets do not want government bonds, then 
bonds must simply not be sold.   
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about the credibility of government bonds.
22 “A government can run a deficit during a 
recession without suffering a deterioration of its creditworthiness if there is a tax and 
spending regime in place that would yield a favourable cash flow (a surplus) under 
reasonable  and  attainable  circumstances”  (p.  302).  Minsky  (1991)  adds:  “The 
government is no different than any other organization in that it needs revenues to 
validate  its  debts”  (p.  28).  Minsky’s  (1986)  conclusion  is  that,  save  exceptional 
situations, the full-employment government budget must be balanced or in surplus. As 
he puts it: “Any deviation from a government budget that is balanced or in surplus 
must be understood as transitory- the war will be over, the resource development 
program will be finished, or income will be at the full employment level” (p. 304).  
Minsky’s  (1986,  1991,  1996)  acknowledgement  to  sound  finance  risks  being 
inconsistent  with  the  key  role  that  he  continues  to  assign  to  fiscal  policy.
23 
Surprisingly, Minsky ignores this crucial problem. In the ‘Agenda for Reform’ that 
closes his famous 1986 book, the compatibility between the so-called sound public 
finance  (p.  302)  and  the  fiscal  stabilization  (p.  297)  and  support  (p.  308)  of  the 
economy is implicitly taken for granted. In what follows, we shall try to explain why. 
To this end, we shall focus on Minsky’s business cycle, thus integrating the Nasica 
and Raybaut (2005) model. By comparing the business cycle à la Keynes (1936) and à 
la Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1986), we shall show that the compatibility between the so-
called soundness of public finance and the soundness of the entire economy may be a 
problem in the first case, but not in the second. This might then explain why Minsky 
(1986) is not concerned about it.  
The literature generally classifies Hyman Minsky as one of the main exponents of the 
Post  Keynesian  School.  Minsky  (1975,  pp.  79-80)  himself  presents  his  financial 
instability hypothesis as an authentic interpretation, a legitimate extension even, of 
The General Theory. In bringing back The General Theory to its cyclical perspective, 
however,  Minsky  (1975,  1982a,  1978,  1980,  1982a,  1986)  introduces  an  upward 
instability which seems entirely extraneous to Keynes’s book. From this perspective, 
the two authors may be considered as two faces of the same coin looking in opposite 
directions.  Minsky  (1975,  1982a,  1978,  1980,  1982a,  1986)  considers  a  vibrant 
economy,  naturally  inclined  to  over-investment  and  over-indebtedness.  Keynes 
                                                            
22 To quote Minsky (1996, p. 4): “The explosion of the government debt relative to gross domestic 
product over the 12 years of Reagan-Bush was largely due to an irresponsible fiscal policy….In the 
present circumstances, the role of tax policy is to assure that a downward trend in the ratio of Federal 
Debt to Gross Domestic Product rules, so that over a span of years the ratio of debt to income is 
lowered from the present 65% to about 50%”. 
23 For an interesting critique of Minsky on this issue, see Wray (2006).  
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(1936), on the contrary, considers a depressed economy tending to chronic under-
investment  and  under-consumption  and  thus  prone  to  high  and  long-lasting 
unemployment. Looking at the last fifteen years, useful examples might be the USA 
and the UK economies in the first case and the European economy in the second. 
Starting from these premises, Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1978, 1980, 1982a, 1986) may be 
considered an author who has extended The General Theory to a vibrant and euphoric 
framework, making it even more general and modern.  
To show the different views about the cycle of Minsky and Keynes, it may be useful 
to  refer  to the graphical representation of  the  business cycle proposed in Hudson 
(1957). The starting point is the IS-LM model with rigid money wages and prices 
shown in figure 1. Its distinctive feature is that, while the LM curve is the usual one, 
the IS curve is U-shaped. Let us consider, for instance, the IS0 curve. Let us also 
assume that Y
’ is the corresponding income level that ensures the normal utilization of 
the existing capital stock. The given capital stock will thus be under-utilized on the 
left of Y
’ and over-utilized on the right. Starting from these presuppositions, Hudson 
(op. cit.) assumes that, for lower (higher) than Y
’ income levels, the income sensitivity 
of  investments  is  so  low  (high)  that  it  falls  (rises)  below  (above)  the  income 
sensitivity of saving. Starting from a point of IS0 on the left (right) of Y
’, an increase 
in income thus induces an excess of saving (investments) over investments (saving) 
whose re-absorption requires a fall (rise) in the interest rate. The IS0 curve is then 
negatively sloped on the left of Y
’ and positively sloped on the right. The intersection 
between the U-shaped IS0 and the LM0 curve identifies three equilibrium points A0, 
B0, C0 in figure 1. Points A0 and C0 represent stable equilibriums. The reason for this 
becomes evident if we assume that the adjustment process is instantaneous in the 
money market, while it implies lags in the goods market. On the left (right) of A0 and 
C0,  the  interest rate  determined by the LM0 curve is  lower (higher) than the one 
required by IS0. The goods market thus experiences an excess of investments (saving) 
over  saving  (investments)  that  stimulates  (depresses)  income  towards  the 
corresponding  equilibrium  value.  Following  an  analogous  line  of  reasoning,  it  is 
evident that B0 instead represents an unstable equilibrium: income tends to fall on its 
left and to rise on its right.
 24  
 
                                                            
24 As shown by Hudson (1957), the stability of the model requires that the slope of the IS curve be 
lower than the slope of the LM. The model is thus stable if the IS curve has a negative slope (as in A0) 
or if its slope is positive but lower than the slope of the LM curve (as in C0). By contrast, the model is 
unstable when the slope of the IS curve is positive and higher than the slope of the LM (as in B0).  
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Figure 1. Hudson’s representation of the business cycle 
 
 
While implying a sophisticated non-linear dynamics, Figure 1 allows a simple and 
effective representation of the business cycle.
25 Let us start with the stable equilibrium 
point  A0  given  by  the  intersection  between  the  IS0  and  LM0  curves.  Let  us  also 
assume that in A0 investments are so low that they do not allow the replacement of the 
existing capital stock. The progressive fall of the capital stock will eventually create a 
lack of capacity that will stimulate investments. This will give rise to an upward shift 
of the IS curve (from IS0 to IS1) that will expand the economy from A0 to A1=B1. In 
the tangency point A1=B1, however, there is upward instability. The interest rate given 
by the LM0 curve is lower than the rate required by the IS1. This denotes an excess of 
investments  over  saving  that  stimulates  the  economy.
26  The  rise  in  income  is 
proportional to the imbalance of the goods market shown by the vertical distance 
between the IS1 and LM0 curves. Income thus rises first at an increasing and then at a 
decreasing rate, finally docking in the new stable equilibrium point C1. This time, the 
high investments increase the capital stock. The progressive rise of the capital stock 
will eventually create a surplus capacity that will depress investments. This will give 
rise  to  a  downward  shift  of  the  IS  curve  (from  IS1  to  IS2)  that  will  depress  the 
economy  from  C1  to  B2=C2.  In  the  new  tangency  point  B2=C2,  however,  there  is 
downward instability. The interest rate determined by the LM0 curve is higher than the 
rate  required  by  the  IS2.  This  denotes  an  excess  of  saving  over  investments  that 
depresses the economy. The fall of income is proportional to the unbalance of the 
goods market shown by the vertical distance between the LM0 and IS2 curves. Income 
                                                            
25 We are grateful to Kumaraswamy Velupillai for signalling Hudson’s interesting article.  
26 According to Hudson (1957), point C1 implies a level of income no higher than the full employment 
one. In the opposite case, the rise of income above full employment would raise prices, the demand of 
money and the interest rate. The consequent upward shift of the LM curve would move point C1 to the 
left, ending by aligning it to the full employment level of income.  
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thus falls first at an increasing and then at a decreasing rate, finally docking in the 
stable equilibrium A2 from which the business cycle starts again.  
Our  succinct  exposition  of  Hudson’s  article  requires  two  important  qualifications. 
Firstly, the IS curve shifts in the turning points of the cycle presuppose a change in 
expectations. In A0 (C1), the progressive fall (rise) of the capital stock ends up by 
raising  (depressing)  current  profits.  This  gradually  implies  an  improvement 
(worsening)  of  profit  expectations  that  shifts  the  IS  curve  upwards  (downwards). 
Figure 1 is thus compatible with the waves of optimism and pessimism that inspire the 
views of the business cycle of both Keynes (1936) and Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1978, 
1980, 1982a, 1986). Secondly, Hudson (1957) keeps the LM curve unchanged only in 
order  to  simplify  the  exposition.  Liquidity  preference  depends  on  the  state  of 
confidence. As a consequence, the wave of optimism (pessimism) striking point A0 
(C1) would not only shift the IS curve upwards (downwards) as in Figure 1. It would 
also move the LM curve downwards (upwards). The result is that the money market 
ends up by accentuating the upward (downward) instability.  
In what follows, we shall keep the LM curve unchanged and utilize Hudson’s (op. 
cit.) framework to analyse the differences between Keynes and Minsky. A careful 
reading of the two authors suggests that, whilst both are at the mercy of waves of 
optimism and pessimism, Minsky ‘fights’ against the upswing while Keynes ‘fights’ 
against the downswing. With very few exceptions, Minsky’s writings focus on the 
inconveniences  of  the  boom,  taking  the  consequent  disaster  and  (above  all)  the 
subsequent recovery for granted. Minsky (1986) himself argues that “The spectacular 
panics, debt deflations, and deep depressions that historically followed a speculative 
boom as well the recovery from depressions are of lesser importance in the analysis of 
instability than the developments over a period characterized by sustained growth that 
leads to the emergence of fragile and unstable financial structures” (p. 173). On the 
contrary,  chapter  22  of  The  General  Theory  stresses  the  precariousness  of  the 
recovery, the need to support it at all costs, the systemic inadequacy of the level of 
investments with respect to the target of full employment, and the precariousness of a 
full employment situation supported by investments arising from the depressive effect 
of accumulation on the marginal efficiency of capital. 
On this basis, let us return to Hudson’s (1957) framework. Between the lines, the 
economy described by chapter 22 of The General Theory is characterized by a high  
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liquidity preference and by a low marginal efficiency of capital.
27 At the extreme, the 
relevant curves may then be LM0 and IS2 in Figure 1. This means that the fundamental 
instability is downward. The systematic excess of saving over investments depresses 
the system to point A2. Keynes (1936) explicitly agrees with Hudson (1957) that in A2 
the  fall  in  the  capital  stock  will  end  up  by  stimulating  investments  and  thus  the 
economy. His concern, however, is that the recovery may be slow and, above all, so 
weak that it is unable to turn into an expansion. In figure 1, for instance, the IS curve 
may shift from IS2 to IS0 rather than to IS1. The system may thus strand in the stable 
unemployment  equilibrium  A0  and  the  business  cycle  may  break  down  in  the 
neighbourhood of its trough.  
By contrast, Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1978, 1980, 1982a, 1986) expressly considers an 
economy whose fundamental instability is upward. The profitability of investments is 
high with respect to the interest rate determined by the money market. At the extreme, 
the  relevant  curves  may  be  LM0  and  IS1  in  Figure  1.  The  systematic  excess  of 
investments over saving stimulates the economy to C1. We thus come to the problems 
of  greatest  concern  to  Minsky.  Why  does  such  a  vibrant  economy  stop  growing 
(Minsky, 1965)? Why does it not stop in point C1 or in its neighbourhood in Figure 1, 
plunging into the great depression represented by point A2 (Minsky, 1982a, 1986)? 
After all, if the IS curve shifted downwards from IS1 to IS0 rather than to IS2, the 
system might settle in the stable point C0 and the cycle would break down in the 
neighbourhood of its ceiling.  
The originality of Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1978, 1980, 1982a, 1986) is that he looks for 
answers in the financial dimension of the economy. Amid the growing euphoria of the 
upswing,  indebtedness  rises  so  rapidly  that  the  financial  system  becomes  fragile. 
Thus, towards the end of the boom, the increase in the rate of interest not only slows 
down  the  expansion:  it  also  triggers  the  financial  crisis.  Under  the  threat  of 
bankruptcy, firms interrupt their investment activity and sell assets in order to redeem 
and  reduce  their  debt.  The  assets  price  fall  strengthens  the  need  to  squeeze 
indebtedness and vice versa. The consequent debt deflation and the recession feed 
each other. In figure 1, the IS curve shifts violently downwards, from IS1 to IS2, 
                                                            
27  Keynes  (1936)  argues  as  follows  on  the  under-consumption  schools  of  thought:  “In  existing 
conditions –or, at least, in the conditions that existed until lately- where the volume of investment is 
unplanned and uncontrolled, subject to the vagaries of the marginal efficiency of capital as determined 
by the private judgment of individual ignorant or speculative, and to a long-term rate of interest which 
seldom or never falls below a conventional level, these schools of thought are, as guides to practical 
policy, undoubtedly in the right.…If it is impracticable materially to increase investment, obviously  
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driving the system in the tangency point B2=C2. Here, the downward instability gains 
the upper hand and the system plunges into the deep depression represented by point 
A2. According to Minsky (1975), however, the downswing has a cathartic function. 
The  speculative  units  fail,  and  the  financial  system  becomes  once  again  robust. 
Together  with  the  tranquillity  of  A2,  this  will  reactivate  confidence.  In  Minsky’s 
(1975, 1982a, 1978, 1980, 1982a, 1986) vibrant economy, the recovery is not even 
under discussion. 
Let  us  now  return  to  fiscal  policy.  According  to  the  previous  analysis,  it  seems 
plausible to assume that the most important phase in terms of intensity and length is 
the downswing in the economics of Keynes and the upswing in the economics of 
Minsky. Figure 2 shows the prevalence of the downward phase (the area between 
LM0 and IS2) in the left-hand panel and of the upward phase (the area between IS1 and 
LM0) in the right-hand one. In the latter case, it is plausible that the government 
surplus required to prevent the increase in income and profits during the upswing 
offsets (or more than offsets) the government deficit required to prevent the fall in 
income and profits during the downswing. Thus, in an economy à la Minsky, the 
fiscal stabilization of the business cycle does not necessarily represent a burden in 
terms of government budget and debt. 
 
Figure 2. Business cycles à la Keynes and à la Minsky 
   
 
Let us now consider the fiscal support to the economy. As we have seen, during the 
business  cycle  an  economy  à  la  Keynes  (1936)  risks  remaining  trapped  in  the 
neighbourhood of the trough, while an economy à la Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1978, 
1980, 1982a, 1986) risks settling in the more appealing neighbourhood of the ceiling. 
In the latter case, a full-employment oriented fiscal policy is thus much less onerous 
in terms of government budget and debt. Let us assume, however, that the cycle does 
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not break off. In Hudson’s framework, there is no stable equilibrium growth path. In 
the absence of the invisible hand, growth is a product of the cycle. Figure 3 applies 
this principle, respectively, to an economy dominated by the downswing à la Keynes 
(1936) and to an economy dominated by the upswing à la Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1978, 
1980, 1982a, 1986). The result is that, while the former experiences a falling income, 
the latter grows reaching higher income levels.
28 In an economy à la Minsky, a fiscal 
policy oriented toward full-employment is again less onerous in terms of government 
budget and debt. 
 
Figure 3. Business cycles and growth 
 
To sum up, Minsky (1986) seems to have goods reasons to believe that a ‘good’ fiscal 
policy is compatible with the so-called soundness of public finance and that only a 
bad fiscal policy (misdirected, inefficient, corrupted) is not.
29 These considerations 
obviously apply to an economy à la Minsky (1975, 1982a, 1978, 1980, 1982a, 1986). 
What would Hyman Minsky have proposed with regard to an economy à la Keynes 
(1936),  for  instance  the  European  economy  of  the  last  fifteen  years?  Given  its 
unsatisfactory  performance  in  terms  of  employment  and  growth,  he  would  have 
probably  privileged  the  soundness  of  the  economy  over  the  soundness  of  public 
finance, prescribing an active and careful use of fiscal policy and fiercely opposing 
the Growth and Stability Pact. To the objection that the issuing of more and more 
government bonds might become a problem, Minsky would have probably answered 
that  –given  the  increasingly  unbalanced  income  distribution-  the  burden  of  the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5). 
28 In a dynamic context where the ceiling and floor change with the passing of time, it would be the 
growth rate (rather than the income level) to increase and to fall. 
29 This section focuses on the income and cash flows effect of fiscal policy. As far as the portfolio 
effect is concerned, however, one of the novelties of Minsky’s (1975, 1982a, 1986) approach lies in 
reminding us that government bonds are assets to the private sector representing an important source of 
liquidity and solvency and therefore of financial stability. If wealth grows with the passing of time 
giving  rise  to  a  growing  demand  for  government  bonds,  financial  market  equilibrium  requires  a 
growing  government  bonds  supply.  Such  an  equilibrium  is  thus  incompatible  with  a  government 
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soundness of public finance must be shouldered by the rich. For instance, he might 
have suggested  the  introduction of a constraint on financial  intermediaries, which 
would compel them to invest a given fraction of their portfolio in government bonds. 
As he puts it (1986): “ finance cannot be left to free markets” (p. 292). However, 
these last considerations are mere conjectures, even if based on a careful reading of 
Minsky’s writings. 
  
7. Fiscal policy and the evolution and prospects of capitalism 
 
Minsky and Whalen (1996) argue that “Capitalism is a dynamic, evolving system that 
comes in many forms. Nowhere is this dynamism more evident than in its financial 
structure”  (p.  156).  With  regard  to  the  evolution  of  the  financial  structure  of  the 
American economy, Minsky and Whalen (1996; see, also, Minsky, 1993) identify the 
following phases: 
(i)  commercial  capitalism.  This  was  the  initial  phase  of  capitalism,  during  which 
external finance was mainly used for trade and manufacturing.  
(ii)  industrial  capitalism.  This  was  the  phase  of  the  first  decades  of  the  previous 
century, during which external finance was used mainly to finance long-term capital 
development.  The  nineteenth  century  was  the  first  great  era  of  capitalism,  which 
required expensive and durable capital assets. The funds were made available through 
commercial banks, investment banks and the flotation of stocks and bonds. The great 
crash of 1929-1933 brought this second stage to an end.  
(iii) paternalistic capitalism. The New Deal restructuring ushered in the paternalistic 
era, based on the low interest rates due to a Federal Reserve unconstrained by gold-
standard  considerations  and  on  countercyclical  fiscal  policies.  In  this  period,  the 
government  took  over  the  responsibility  for  the  adequacy  of  profits.  As  a 
consequence,  internal  cash  flows  of  firms  could  finance  their  investments.  Firms 
rather than bankers were the masters of the private economy. The stabilization of 
profits, however, spread optimism and thus boosted speculative behaviours.  
(iv) money manager-capitalism. This is the current stage of capitalism, resulting from 
the evolution of speculative financial practices and from the emergence of plans that 
have supplemented social security with private pensions. As the label money-manager 
capitalism suggests, in such a system money managers dominate financial markets.
30 
                                                            
30 Money-manager capitalism introduces a new layer of intermediation into the financial structure. The 
largest proportion of the liabilities of corporations are held either by financial institutions, such as bank  
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Their aim  is the maximization of  the value  of the investments  made by the fund 
holders,  i.e.  the  maximization  of  the  total  return  on  assets  (the  combination  of 
dividends  and  interest  received  and  the  appreciation  in  per  share  value).  Today’s 
money-managers are but little concerned with the development of the capital assets of 
an economy. They do not conform to Schumpeter’s vision of bankers as the ephors of 
capitalism, who assure that  finance serves  progress. Today’s  financial structure is 
more  akin  to  Keynes’  (1936)  characterization  of  the  financial  arrangements  of 
advanced capitalism as a casino.  
When one considers the pressure due to the rapidly evolving financial system and to 
the  economy's  other  structural  changes,  it  is  not  surprising  that  current  economic 
insecurity is so widespread. Looking ahead, Minsky (1986) envisages two different 
futures for American capitalism. Fortress capitalism, a system with declining fortunes 
for all but a few who must seek protection behind walled and gated communities; this 
is  the  result  of  a  return  to  laissez-faire.  The  alternative  is  a  shared-prosperity 
capitalism, characterized by public intervention in the economy. 
In the current era, economic success does not only require economic growth, low 
unemployment and minimal inflation. It also requires that prosperity be available to 
the whole of society and that economic insecurity be reduced. Thus, the task of big 
government is also to reduce inequality and insecurity. To this end, the government 
has  to  provide  full  employment  and  to  promote  a  high  performance  path  to 
competitiveness  (as  an  alternative  to  the  low-wage  path).  This  requires  not  only 
incentives for private investment but also public investment in education and training, 
science and technology, and infrastructure.  
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
 
Drawing on The General Theory, of which he is one of the most famous and original 
interpreters, Minsky (1975) rejects the orthodox assumptions of unbounded individual 
and collective rationality, placing uncertainty and financial instability at the centre of 
his analysis. In his view, the limits of individual and collective rationality feed each 
other. As a consequence, the economy assumes a cyclical behaviour that drives it 
from an expansion to a speculative boom followed by a debt deflation and a deep 
depression. In bringing  back Keynes’s theory to its cyclical perspective, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
trust companies, or by pensions or mutual funds. Individual wealth holdings increasingly take the form 
of ownership of the liabilities of the managed funds.  
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Minsky  introduces  an  upward  instability  which  seems  entirely  extraneous  to  The 
General Theory. In terms of business cycle and growth, an economy à la Minsky 
(1975, 1982a, 1978, 1980, 1982a, 1986) seems thus to be quite different from an 
economy à la Keynes (1936). Looking at the last fifteen years, useful examples might 
be the USA and the UK economies in the first case and the European economy in the 
second. In this perspective, Minsky may be considered an author who has extended 
the economics of Keynes to a vibrant and euphoric economy, making it even more 
general and modern. 
In comparison with the Keynesian tradition, in Hyman Minsky’s economics fiscal 
policy is even more important and effective. Government intervention is not only 
necessary to reach full employment; it is also indispensable to contain capitalism’s 
instability and to avoid the disaster. The effect of fiscal policy is not only to underpin 
and  stabilize  aggregate  demand,  income  and  employment.  It  has  also  the  task  to 
protect the robustness of the financial system by stabilizing profits and by issuing 
government bonds. Finally, big government has the function of reducing inequality 
and insecurity and of promoting a high performance path to competitiveness (as an 
alternative to the low-wage path). Although Minsky’s (1975, 1982a, 1986) analysis 
mainly refers to a closed economy, it can be easily extended to an open economy. The 
opening up of the economy increases its fragility in many ways. As a consequence, 
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